State of Utah v. David E. Reynolds  : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1975
State of Utah v. David E. Reynolds : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B Romney; Attorney General; Earl F Dorius; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondents.
O Brenton Rowe; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant .
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation




IN THE DEC 1 / 197-
SUPREME COURT 
'AM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
OF THE .uLen Clark Law School 
STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E O F U T A H , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
D A V I D E. R E Y N O L D S , 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No, 
B R I E F OF R E S P O N D E N T 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, 
Judge, Presiding. 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
i BRENTON R O W E 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Associativa 
343 South 600 East y 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
A ttorneys for Appelant 
13! D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF T H E 
CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT .. 1 
R E L I E F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I. APPELLANT RECEIVED T H E 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUN-
SEL AT ALL STAGES OF THE CRIMI 
NAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM ... 4 
POINT II . THE MERE FAILURE TO RE-
QUEST A SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUC-
TION DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A DE-
NIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL 7 
CONCLUSION 11 
Cases Cited 
Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 
(1969) 5 
Andreason v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 
1278 (1972) 7 
Application of Lomich, 221 F.Supp. 500 (D.C. 
Mont. 1963) 9 
Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966) .... 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T A B L E O F CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 
(1970) 11 
Kapsalis v. United States, 345 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 
1965) 9 
People v. Hinton, 132 I11.2d 409, 270 N.E.2d 93 
1971) 9 
Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 
1961) 10 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 72 
L.Ed. 158 (1932) 5 
Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959) 9 
State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 
(1974) 11 
State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 (1957) 5 
United States v. Cariola, 211 F.Supp. 423 (D.C. 
N.J . 1962) 9 
United States ex rel. Blolth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 
364 (2d Cir. 1963) 9 
United States v. Fruge, 495 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 
1974) 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent; 
vs. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The appellant, David E. Reynolds, appeals from a 
jury verdict of guilty of unlawful distribution for value 
of a controlled substance in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty by a jury of un-
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lawful distribution for value of a controlled substance in 
the Third Judicial District Court on February 20, 1974. 
Appellant was then sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law 
on March 19, 1974, by the Honorable Joseph G. Jepp-
son, Judge. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The respondent respectfully submits that the jury 
verdict of guilty in the Court below should be affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
In September, 1973, Salt Lake County Deputy 
Sheriff Ralph R. Tolman was approached by Scott 
Helmsin, who stated that he wished to work with Tol-
man as his agent to help him in the purchasing of a con-
trolled substance from David Reynolds, the appellant 
(T. 80-81). Officer Tolman told Helmsin that if he 
could deal with someone to set up a buy and then con-
tact him and they would make the buy together (T. 82). 
On October 11, 1973, Helmsin called Officer Tolman 
and told him that they should be able to find the appel-
lant that evening (T. 83). 
At approximately 8:55 p.m., on October 11, 1973, 
Officer Tolman, along with Helmsin and Deputy 
Sheriff Jim Duncan drove to an apartment complex 
in Salt Lake County where they met the appellant 
(T. 83, 85). Helmsin asked the appellant if he could 
get Speed (T. 86). Appellant replied, "How many?" 
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and Officer Tolman responded by saying, "A hun-
dred," and the appellant said "All right." (T. 87, 90). 
Officer Tolman then asked the price and appellant 
said, "twenty dollars." (T. 90). When Officer Tolman 
complained about the price, appellant said, "That's the 
price if you want them." (T. 91). Officer Tolman then 
gave appellant twenty dollars and appellant said he 
would be back in about ten minutes (T. 91, 93). Appel-
lant returned at 9:10 p.m., and Officer Tolman ap-
proached his truck on the driver's side (T. 93, 94). 
Appellant handed a little package to Helmsin who in 
turn handed it to Officer Tolman (T. 94). Officer 
Tolman immediately placed the package, containing 
approximately one hundred tablets in an evidence enve-
lope. On November 9, 1973, a laboratory anaylsis of 
the tablets disclosed that they were amphetamine (T. 
125-126). 
Appellant was arrested on a warrant for unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance on No-
vember 7, 1973 (T. 5, 115). On November 8, 1973, 
Mr. Don L Bybee represented the defendant in a hear-
ing for a bond reduction and was successful in convinc-
ing the court to reduce appellant's bond to $2,000 (T. 
4). Mr. Bybee then represented the appellant at a hear-
ing before the Honorable Joseph G. Peppson, to deter-
mine whether or not there was entrapment leading to 
appellant's arrest (T. 52). The court found there was 
not sufficient evidence to find any entrapment (T. 67). 
Mr. Bybee was also retained by the appellant to 
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represent him at his trial on February 19 and 20, 1974 
(T. 72). After conducting a vigorous and extensive 
defense of the appellant, Mr. Bybee withdrew his re-
quested jury instructions which he had submitted to 
this Court, because he and the appellant felt they were 
substantially covered by the Court's instructions (T. 
226). After the jury found the appellant guilty of un-
lawful distribution for value of a controlled substance 
(T. 228), Mr. Bybee made a motion for a verdict of 
not guilty notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, 
which the Court denied (T. 231). After the verdict, 
Mr. Bybee was successful in persuading the Court to 
allow the appellant to remain free on bond until his 
sentencing appearance (T. 231). 
Mr. Bybee next represented the appellant at his 
sentencing hearing on March 19, 1974, at which time 
the appellant was sentenced for the indeterminate term 
as provided by law (T. 45). On April 22, 1974, Mr. 
Bybee filed a timely notice of appeal on behalf of the 
Appellant (T. 46). Mr. Bybee petitioned the Court 
on May 17, 1974, to allow him to withdraw as attorney 
for the appellant in this appeal inasmuch as the appel-
lant has been unable to pay attorney's fees involved in 
his defense (T. 48). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
A P P E L L A N T R E C E I V E D T H E E F F E C -
T I V E A S S I S T A N C E OF COUNSEL A T 
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A L L STAGES OF T H E C R I M I N A L PRO-
C E E D I N G S A G A I N S T H I M . 
The right to effective or adequate assistance of 
counsel was enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 
72 L.Ed. 158 (1932), which held that failure to make an 
effective appointment of counsel violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and is a denial of due pro-
cess under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Utah Supreme Court announced a similar 
view in State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887 
(1957), holding that the privilege of an accused to the 
assistance of counsel is one of the fundamental rights, 
meaning the assistance of a reputable member of the bar 
who is willing and in a position to honestly and con-
scientiously represent the interest of the defendant. In 
Alires v. Turner, 22 Uah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the requirements con-
sistituting "effective counsel": 
"The requirement is not satisfied by a 
sham or pretense of an appearance in the rec-
ord by an attorney who manifests no real con-
cern about the interests of the accused. The 
entitlement is to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness 
to identify himself with the interests of the 
defendant and present such defenses as are 
available to him under the law and consistent 
with the ethics of the profession." 449 P.2d 
at 243. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
The record is replete with examples that appel-
lant's retained counsel, Mr. Don L. Bybee, had a real 
and sincere concern about the interests of his client and 
conducted his defense in a professional and commend-
able manner using a variety of legal skills. Mr. Bybee 
was successful in convincing the court to lower the ap-
pellant's bond when he was arrested so he could be free 
until the trial (T. 4). Mr. Bybee recognized the pos-
sible defense of entrapment and presented a well-pre-
pared attack at the entrapment hearing (T. 52). At 
the trial itself, Mr. Bybee appeared to raise every ob-
jection which was available to him. Upon cross-exami-
nation of the State's witnesses, he skillfully attacked 
their memory of the events on the night of the drug 
sale and attempted to use the testimonies of these ad-
verse witnesses to establish possible defenses for the 
actions of his client. Mr. Bybee called a female ac-
quaintance of the appellant, who provided evidence of 
entrapment favorable to the defense (T. 140). Finally, 
defense counsel called the appellant as a witness and 
carefully and skillfully established his defense through 
his client's own words (T. 162). 
After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, 
defense counsel still expressed a concern for the interests 
of his client. Mr. Bybee used the wise tactic of a motion 
for a verdict of not guilty notwithstanding the verdict 
of the jury (T. 231); he persuaded the Court to allow 
the appellant to remain on bond until his sentencing 
(T. 231) ; he represented the appellant at his sentencing 
(T. 45); and he then filed a timely notice of appeal 
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from the conviction (T. 46). Mr. Bybee withdrew as 
appellant's attorney on the appeal only when it appeared 
that the appellant would not even be able to pay for the 
expense accrued during his previous defense (T. 48). 
The total sum of these acts indicates the appellant 
was represented by a capable attorney who was well 
versed in the facts of the case, interested in the future 
of his client, and presented a defense in a conscientious 
and adequate manner. The appellant received effective 
counsel, which does not mean errorless counsel, and not 
counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel 
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective as-
sistance. United States v. Fruge, 495 F,2d 557 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
P O I N T I I 
T H E M E R E F A I L U R E TO R E G U E S T A 
S P E C I F I C J U R Y I N S T R U C T I O N D O E S 
NOT AMOUNT TO A D E N I A L O F E F -
F E C T I V E A S S I S T A N C E OF COUNSEL. 
Appellant contends that he did not receive effective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to pre-
sent his case in a fundamental respect in that he failed 
to request a specific jury instruction. Appellant's Brief 
at 6. 
In Andreason v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d 
1278 (1972), the petitioner in an appeal from a denial 
of his writ of habeas corpus contended that he was denied 
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effective counsel because his attorney failed to request 
an instruction on alibi. In disposing of the contention 
the Utah Supreme Court said: 
"His [defense counsel] omission of a 
request for an instruction on alibi may have 
been an oversight or a matter of strategy after 
evaluating the testimony of the alibi witnesses. 
Nevertheless, a review of the record negates 
a conclusion, as expressed by plaintiff, that 
defense counsel's presentation was tantamount 
to a sham or pretense of an appearance in the 
record with no real concern about the interests 
of his client." 493 P.2d at 1280. 
The record indicates that appellant's counsel was 
well aware of the instructions that were presented to 
the jury. When asked by the Court if he had any ex-
ceptions to the instructions, the following response 
followed: 
MR. B Y B E E : Thank you. For the record, 
the defendant, David Reynolds, withdraws the 
requested instructions which we have submitted 
to the Court because we believe that they are 
substantially covered by the Court's instruc-
tions. (T. 226). 
Mr. Bybee then proceeded to take exception to two of 
the instructions presented by the Court (T. 226). I t 
is possible that Mr. Bybee was well aware there was no 
instruction on the issue whether or not Mr. Reynolds 
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was acting as an agent of the police in obtaining a con-
trolled substance, but omitted it because of his overall 
trial strategy. 
I t is an established rule in many jurisdictions that 
counsel is not to be second-guessed on matter of judg-
ment or trial strategy and even mistakes and an unfavor-
able result does not, by itself, amount to a denial of 
effective assistance of counsel. Application of Lomich, 
221 F.Supp. 500 (D.C. Mont. 1936); United States v. 
Cariola, 211 F.Supp. 423 (D.C.N.J. 1962); United 
States ex rel, Blolth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 
1963); Kapsalis v. United States, 345 F.2d 392 (7th 
Cir. 1965). Mistakes of counsel or trial strategy that 
backfires does not amount to a denial of due process 
unless on the whole the representation is of such low 
caliber as to be equivalent to no representation at all, 
and to reduce the proceedings to a farce or a sham. 
People v. Hinton, 132 IU.2d 409, 270 N.E.2d 93 
(1971); Kapsalis v. United States, supra. 
Respondent also contends that the fact petitioner 
retained his own counsel ought to be fatal to his alle-
gation. Courts have often attached some significance 
to whether the attorney was privately retained or court-
appointed in determining whether relief should be grant-
ed. In Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959), 
the court said: 
" I t has been repeatedly held that in cases 
of counsel selected by the defendant, the com-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
w 
mission of what retroactively may appear to be 
errors of judgment on the part of the attorney 
does not constitute a constitutional lack of due 
process. . ." Id. at 842. 
In Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 
1961), cert. den. 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct. 1883, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 1056 (1963), the privately retained trial attorney 
failed to call defendant's witnesses and the Court said: 
". . . we think it basic to the claim of re-
lief, since defendants were represented by their 
own employed trial counsel, that they may not 
assign as error that the mistakes or errors of 
their counsel constitued an unfair trial. . . . " 
Id. at 171. 
Respondent submits that on appeal, this Court 
should take cognizance of the presumption that the ap-
pellant's rights were safeguarded by the trial court, and 
that the defense counsel faithfully performed his duty 
to protect the rights of his client. See Busby v. Holman, 
356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966). I t then becomes incum-
bent upon the appellant to prove his right to relief by 
showing the incompetency of his counsel. Such a burden 
is a heavy one and relief is granted only in extreme 
cases where counsel has been so grossly ineffective as 
to constitute no representation at all, or a farce, sham, 
or pretense. Respondent contends that this burden of 
proof has not been met by appellant and the decisions 
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and strategy of his trial counsel were made in his best 
interest. 
This Court in Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 
465 P.2d 343 (1970), warned that many guilty men 
have escaped their punishments from the law through 
the loophole of claiming inadequate representation of 
counsel, and that lawabiding citizens would suffer un-
less courts look more carefully at the requirements for 
effective counsel as set forth in the constitution. In a 
reaff irmance of this view, Mr. Justice Crockett recently 
stated in State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 
1313 (1974), the following compelling logic: 
"In regard to the defendant's contention 
that he was denied effective counsel: we are 
implied to remark that it is nothing less than 
shameful that our law seems to have degen-
erated to a point where whenever an accused 
is convicted of crime, the charge of incompe-
tency of counsel is, with ever increasing fre-
quency, leveled at capable attorneys who have 
given entirely adequate service, when the real 
difficulty was that he had a guilty client. In 
this respect also defendant had his entitlement 
of adequate representation by capable and con-
scientious counsel." 517 P.2d at 1315 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that based upon the fore-
going reasons, appellant was afforded the effective as-
sistance of counsel by a capable and conscientious at-
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torney and any possible error by defense counsel did 
not amount to a denial of due process. The respondent, 
therefore, requests that the judgment below be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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